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Self-defence: Insane Delusions and Reasonable Force 
 
R v Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725 
 




 June 2011, the police were called to the Cappucino Café in the Westfields Shopping 
Centre in Shepherd’s Bush. A 29-year-old man, Seun Oye, had been found in the café’s staff 
area. As he was not a member of staff, the manager was summoned. He later described Oye 
as “twitching in a strange manner”. The manager locked Oye in the room and called the 
police. When they arrived, Oye hid in a void in the ceiling. He refused to come down and 
gave bizarre reasons for his refusal to do so: firstly “because I'm selfish” and later because 
he was reading a book. He also threw crockery at the police officers. Eventually he was 
persuaded to come down whereupon he was arrested and taken to Hammersmith police 
station.  
 
No medical issues were identified, and tests for alcohol or drug consumption came back 
negative. However, a history of cannabis use was recorded. He was detained in a cell 
overnight. The next day, he was seen in his cell by a specialist drugs worker, but this was 
terminated by the worker who felt uncomfortable being alone in the cell with Oye. As the 
worker left, and when the cell door was temporarily open, Oye tried to escape from the 
custody suite. He punched a male police officer (Sergeant Watts) in the face, knocking him 
to the ground, and then punched a female officer (PC Thompson), displacing some of her 
teeth and fracturing her jaw. As other officers arrived, he fought violently, lashing out and 




 July, Oye was charged with one count of inflicting GBH (for breaking PC Thompson’s 
jaw) and two counts of affray (the first relating to the incident in the café and the second to 
the violent struggle in the custody suite). He was also sectioned under the Mental Health 
Act 1983 and detained in hospital, where he continued to act “strangely”. However, he 




In a pre-trial statement, Oye said that he had woken up on 30
th
 June feeling “paranoid” and 
with the feeling that “evil spirits” were watching him. He had then been guided to the café 
by “good spirits”. In the café, he believed that the police officers were the agents of the evil 
spirits and that they would harm him if he came down from his hiding place in the ceiling. 
The next day when he woke up in the police station cell, he believed that he had “acquired 
supernatural powers”, apparently by drinking water from the toilet cistern. He took his 
opportunity to escape but had to defend himself by throwing punches when the police in 
the custody suite “rushed him”. 
 
Two psychiatrists, Dr Adegoke and Dr Walsh, interviewed Oye. They agreed that Oye had 
experienced a psychotic episode on 30
th
 June, but that he had recovered with the use of 
medication and was fit to stand trial. They also agreed that, on the days when the alleged 
offences had taken place, he had been suffering such a defect of reason that he had not 
known what he was doing, and/or had not appreciated that what he was doing was wrong; 
in short, that he was entitled to be given the special verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  
 
At Oye’s trial at Isleworth Crown Court in March 2013, the recorder directed the jury on 
both insanity and self-defence. He emphasised that the agreed psychiatric evidence (which 
was unchallenged by the Crown) was that Oye had been insane at the time of the alleged 
offences. Nevertheless, the jury rejected both defences and returned guilty verdicts on all 
three counts. Oye appealed. A number of issues were raised on appeal but the key issue was 
whether, if a person purported to act in self-defence in response to a genuine, but insanely 
deluded, belief that he was being attacked or threatened, and used force that was 
reasonable in the circumstances as he believed them to be, he was entitled to an acquittal 
on that basis. 
 
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL BUT SUBSTITUTING A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY BY REASON 
OF INSANITY, that although the second limb of the defence of self-defence is not “solely 
objective” it nevertheless “unquestionably incorporates (by its requirement of 
reasonableness) objective considerations” [at 39].  
 
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that Oye genuinely believed that “evil spirits” were 
attacking him, he could not rely on this belief to support his claim that he had used no more 
than reasonable force in self-defence. To accede to the defence argument would have 
“most disconcerting” implications. Davis LJ stated [at 45 – 47]: 
“It could mean that the more insanely deluded a person may be in using violence in 
purported self-defence the more likely that an entire acquittal may result. It could 
mean that such an individual who for his own benefit and protection may require 
hospital treatment or supervision gets none. It could mean that the public is exposed 
to possible further violence from an individual with a propensity for suffering insane 
delusions, without any intervening preventative remedies being available to the courts 
in the form of hospital or supervision orders. Thus, whatever the purist force in the 
argument, there are strong policy objections to the approach advocated on behalf of 
the appellant. In our view it is not right… An insane person cannot set the standards of 
reasonableness as to the degree of force used by reference to his own insanity.” 
The Court of Appeal therefore rejected Oye’s appeal in relation to self-defence but allowed 
his appeal on the ground of insanity. During the trial, the recorder had “repeatedly” 
reminded the jury about the “unchallenged psychiatric evidence”, but the jury had 
nevertheless rejected it. The appeal court could not see a “safe or rational basis for 
departing” from that evidence [at 63]. The court therefore utilised its power under s.6 of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to substitute a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on 
all three counts. Finally, in terms of the disposal option, the Court imposed an absolute 
discharge, on the basis that Oye had gone on to make “an entire recovery” from the 
psychotic incident. It followed that neither a hospital order nor a supervision order would 




In reaching its conclusion the Court of Appeal in Oye relied on the earlier Court of Appeal 
decisions in R v Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245, [2003] QB 1 and R v Canns [2005] EWCA 
Crim 2264. In the former case, the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the 
appellant’s murder conviction was unsafe on the basis that fresh medical evidence of 
paranoid personality disorder was relevant to his (failed) plea of self-defence (although the 
appeal was allowed on the alternative ground of diminished responsibility). Lord Woolf CJ 
stated [Martin, at 67]: 
 
“We would accept that the jury are entitled to take into account in relation to self-
defence the physical characteristics of the defendant. However, we would not agree 
that it is appropriate, except in exceptional circumstances which would make the 
evidence especially probative, in deciding whether excessive force has been used to 
take into account whether the defendant is suffering from some psychiatric 
condition.” 
 
In Canns, the Court of Appeal followed Martin in dismissing an appeal against a 
manslaughter conviction. The appellant, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, had 
pleaded self-defence at his trial, but that had failed on the basis that his belief that he was 
being attacked by the victim was caused by his own delusions. Rose LJ approved the trial 
judge’s directions to the jury thus [Canns, at 19]: 
 
“It cannot be right that the more psychotic a defendant may be the greater his 
chances of acquittal, because of his genuine delusions. Do you follow? If the test was a 
purely subjective one through and through, psychotic and dangerous defendants are 
likely always to be acquitted because their reaction was reasonable by their own 
standards. The law is that defendants do not set their own standards of 
reasonableness. It is not for a defendant in his own mind to set the standard of 
reasonableness, it is for the jury, considering all the circumstances but not the 
psychiatric condition, to set the standards of reasonableness in considering the 
individual case.” 
 
In Oye, the appellant sought to distinguish Martin and Canns on the basis that his case 
involved “exceptional circumstances”. This was rejected. The Court acknowledged that what 
exactly Lord Woolf in Martin had meant by “exceptional circumstances” was “unexplained”, 
but Davis LJ said that “at all events if Martin was not considered an exceptional case then 
we do not see how or why the present case should be” [at 53]. 
 
Finally it was contended that Martin and Canns had been “overtaken” by the enactment of 
s.76 of the Criminal Justice & Immigration Act 2008. This was rejected on the basis that 
s.76(9) made it clear that the section was intended to “clarify the operation of the existing 
defences”, including self-defence, not to change them [at 56]. Oye’s appeal on the basis of 
self-defence therefore failed [at 57]. 
 
In one sense, the case of Oye merely complements the earlier Court of Appeal decisions, in 
Martins and Canns, that a plea of self-defence will not be accepted where the defendant’s 
own psychotic or otherwise insane delusions may have genuinely caused him to believe that 
he was under attack. This is because the second limb of the defence, that the amount of 
force used be reasonable, includes “objective considerations”. However, Oye is a useful 
development of the law in another sense in that it confirms that the pre-existing common 
law principles on this issue have not been “overtaken” by the enactment of s.76 of the 
Criminal Justice & Immigration Act 2008. As Davis LJ pointed out, the statute merely clarifies 
the common law but does not seek to change it.  
 
This much is both clear and understandable; after all, if a defendant cannot invoke his own 
self-induced intoxication to support a plea of self-defence (s.76(5) of the 2008 Act; R v 
O’Grady [1987] QB 995, [1987] 3 WLR 321; R v O’Connor [1991] Crim LR 135; R v Hatton 
[2005] EWCA Crim 2951, [2006] 1 Cr App R 16) then it logically follows that he cannot invoke 
his own insane delusions to do so either.  
 
It should not be forgotten that Martin establishes the intriguing possibility that evidence 
pertaining to the defendant’s “psychiatric condition” might nevertheless be taken into 
account for the purposes of a self-defence plea “in exceptional circumstances which would 
make the evidence especially probative”. Martin itself was deemed not to be sufficiently 
“exceptional” and neither was Canns nor Oye. If those two cases fall short of the 
“exceptional” threshold it is submitted that we may have to wait a very long time before 
such a case does arise. 
 
Perhaps Parliament may deem it appropriate to add another subsection to s.76 to further 
“clarify” the law. The section has been amended twice already, by s.148 of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing & Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and by s.43 of the Crime & Courts Act 
2013, so a further amendment along the following lines might not be inappropriate: 
 
‘Subsection (4)(b) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief induced by psychosis or 
any other psychiatric disorder, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would 
make the evidence especially probative.’ 
 
 
 
